Patentability of Pioneering
Pharmaceuticals: What's the Use?*
This Comment explores the manner in which the Patent and
Trademark Office applies the patentable utility requirement to
pharmaceutical inventions and illustrates the difficulties biotechnology companies face in attempting to fulfill this requirement. After
exploring potential explanations for and alternatives to the
requirement, this Comment will conclude that, as currently applied,
the utility requirement is inconsistent with our patent law and
contrary to the policy objectives underlying our patent system.
I.

INTRODUCTION

To be granted a patent, an inventor must first establish that his or her
invention or discovery falls within an established category of patentable
subject matter and is new, useful, and non-obvious. 1 These threshhold
issues, together with enablement, 2 constitute the statutory requirements
for patentability. Novelty is further defined in 35 U.S.C. § 102, and the
concept of obviousness is explained in § 103. As to what constitutes
"utility," the Code provides little guidance.3
Patentable utility has been considered in a variety of contexts,
including international trade and patent harmonization, and proposed

* Special thanks to Prof. Paul Horton for his guidance & advice in the
preparation of this Comment, to David Forman and Rick Burgoon for resource materials
and valuable insights, and to Nancy Howe for her consistent support and encouragement.
1. Patents may be granted for any new and useful processes, machines, articles
of manufacture, or compositions of matter, or for any new and useful improvements in
the aforementioned statutory subject matter. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
2. A clear, written description of the invention sufficientto enable another person
skilled in the art to practice that invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
3. According to 35 U.S.C. § 101, patentableinventionsmustbe"newand useful,"
and the constitutional authority for the U.S. patent system gives Congress the "power to
promote the progress of science and useful arts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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changes in the term and priority dating of patents. 4 Patentable utility
of gene fragments was a consideration in the recent controversy over
attempts by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to patent human gene
sequences derived from the genome project. 5 This "utility" or "practical
utility" requirement has been the subject of numerous law review articles
and has been addressed in pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry
trade journals, newspaper articles, and position papers. 6
Upon review of these materials, one cannot help but notice the striking
diversity of opinion regarding the significance of this requirement.
Some have argued that practical utility represents a minimal requirement,
one which is easy to satisfy and of little practical significance. 7 Others
have taken the position that it is sensible and necessary for the patent
office to consider the claimed use of an invention. 8 Still others have
argued that, even if it is necessary, the utility requirement is ill-defined,
misapplied, and represents a pernicious threat to the future of America's
biotechnology industry. 9

4. See, e.g., David Goldman et al., Round Four for Biotech Patent Protection
Legislation,J. PROPRIETARY RTS., Apr. 1993, at 31; Steve Sternberg, ProposedPatent
Legislation Could BreakFledglingBiotechFirms, BIOWORLD TODAY, June 29, 1994, at
4; Letter from Charles E. Ludlam & Carl B. Feldbaum, Biotechnology Industry
Organization, to Bruce A. Lehman, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks (June 27,
1994) (on file with author).
5. Paul H. Ginsberg, Patentability and Technology Transfer Issues Relating to
the NIH PatentApplications,in TECH. LICENSING & LITIG. 1993, 641 (Practicing L. Inst.
1993) [hereinafter Ginsberg, Patentability]; Pamela Docherty, Comment, The Human
Genome: A Patenting Dilemma, 26 AKRON L. REV. 525 (1993); Paul H. Ginsberg, The
NIH cDNA Patent Application and Technology Transfer Issues, J. PROPRIETARY RTS.,
July 1992, at 18; Stephen B. Maebius, Comment, Novel DNA Sequences and the Utility
Requirement: The Human Genome Initiative, J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 651
(1992).
6. See, e.g., Victoria Slind-Flor, Pending Patent Problems: BiotechFirms Blame
Impractical Demands for Delaying Patents, NAT'L L.J., May 23, 1994, at Al; Panic in
the Petri Dish, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 27, 1994, at B5; Letter from S. Leslie
Misrock& Albert P. Halluin, Biotechnology Industry Organization, to Bruce A. Lehman,
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks (May 2, 1994) (on file with author).
7. See, e.g., MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ch. 11 (2d
ed. 1992); see also Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards:
Economic Perspectiveson Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803 (1988). Professor Merges,
arguing for adoption of some sort of "commercial success" approach to utility,
complains that the utility requirement has "devolved over the years into a rather minimal
obstacle to obtaining a patent. Today, a patent will not be withheld even though the
invention works only in an experimental setting, and has no proven use in the field or
factory." Id at 812. It is important to note that commercial success has never been the
standard for patentability in the United States, but that an invention be capable of
commercial application is a requirement in Europe and some other countries.
8. Kenneth D. Sibley, Practical Utility: Evolution Suspended?, 32 IDEA: J.L. &
TECH. 203 (1991-92).
9. .See William D. Noonan, PatentingMedicalTechnology, 11 J. LEGAL MED. 263
(1990); see also Eric P. Mirabel, "Practical Utility" Is a Useless Concept, 36 AM. U.
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The utility requirement has generated sufficient controversy that Bruce
Lehman, the Commissioner of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO),
held a public hearing to consider this issue. He invited comments on
whether the legal standards underlying the patentable utility requirement
are clear and appropriate for biotechnology inventions and whether these
The
standards are being applied correctly and uniformly. 10
Commissioner's Notice solicited testimony to "assist the PTO in
identifying problems, if any, that exist in the law governing practical
utility or its application by the PTO during exarnination." 11 After the

L. REV. 811 (1987). Throughout the text of this Comment, reference will be made to
two related, but distinguishable industries: the biotechnology industry and the
pharmaceutical industry. The former represents a relatively new industry, founded
largely on independent discoveries in recombinant DNA and monoclonal antibody
technology. The latter is a more august industry comprised, for the most part, of large,
often multinational companies that employ hundreds of persons and enjoy net sales in
excess of 100 million dollars per year. Biotechnology companies tend to be small,
entrepreneurial, and financially insecure; only a relative handful are profitable with the
majority engaged in an ongoing quest for venture capital. Dr. Kenneth Widder, C.E.O.
of Molecular Biosystems, puts it this way: "A biotechnology company is basically a
pharmaceutical company that is unencumbered by profits." Patent Protection for
Biotechnologica!Inventions, 1994: Public Hearing Before the Patent and Trademark
Office (San Diego, Oct. 17, 1994) (Statement of Kenneth Widder, C.E.O., Molecular
Biosystems). Common to both industries is the capital-intensive nature of their research
and development efforts, the inherent complexity of endeavor in establishing effective
treatments for human diseases (whether those treatments be based on newer "biotechnology-based" approaches or more conventional pharmaceutical development through
synthesis or fermentation), and oversight and regulation of their respective efforts by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The patentable utility requirement affects both
industries by requiring that each provide proof of utility in humans. If the utility
requirement is perceived to be a problem for companies within the large, well established
pharmaceutical industry, then it could be expected to be even more burdensome on the
relatively new, cash-poor companies of which the biotechnology industry is comprised.
10. Notice of Public Hearings and Request for Comments on Patent Protection for
Biotechnological Inventions, 59 Fed. Reg. 45,267 (1994) [hereinafter Commissioner's
Notice]. The hearing, which took place in San Diego on October 17, 1994, included
testimony from 56 individuals representing, inter alia, law firms, biotechnology
companies, research institutions, and patient advocate groups. Oral testimony from the
hearing [hereinafter Public Hearing], together with written comments accepted, are
available through the PTO. (Contact JeffKushan at the PTO at (703) 305-9300 or by
electronic mail at kushan@uspto.gov.)
11. 59 Fed. Reg. at 45,268. The Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO)
prepared a detailed report that was distributed at the public hearing. Biotechnology
Industry Organization, Critical Synergy: The Biotechnology Industry and Intellectual
Property Protection (Oct. 17, 1994) (unpublished report, on file with author) [hereinafter
BIO Report]. This report contains position papers, draft testimony, and copies of
previous correspondence between the BIO and PTO Commissioner Lehman. BIO
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public hearing, the PTO issued proposed examination guidelines that
purport to establish uniform policies and procedures that patent
examiners are to apply to all patent applications. 12 By issuing these
guidelines the PTO seems to concede the point that the utility standard
is misunderstood, if not misapplied, especially in the area of pharmaceutical applications. 13 Although the efforts of the Commissioner and
others within the PTO to address this issue are to be commended, the
guidelines do not carry the force of law. Additionally, they do not
represent a departure from past examination practice insofar as certain
pharmaceutical applications will not be considered useful unless there
exists very real evidence of human clinical utility. 14
This Comment will explore the current state of the law regarding the
utility requirement and how that law is applied by the PTO. This
Comment will also illustrate how the utility requirement can pose
problems with respect to the patentability of certain pharmaceutical or
biotechnological inventions. Section II will trace how the PTO and the
courts have applied the utility requirement throughout the years. Section
III will develop hypothetical examples in an attempt to provide a context
for much of the analysis of this Comment and to demonstrate some of
the problems that the utility requirement can create. Section IV will
consider the options available for addressing utility rejections today.
Section V will consider potential explanations for the PTO's basis for
utility rejections. In Section VI, this Comment will conclude that, even

represents over 540 biotechnology companies, research centers, and others in the
industry. Id at iii.
12. Request for Comments on Proposed Utility Examination Guidelines, 60 Fed.
Reg. 97, 98 ( 1995). These guidelines considered testimony from the public hearing with
respect to a detailed legal analysis of the pertinent statutes and case law. This legal
analysis, entitled Overview of Legal Precedent Governing the Utility Requirement, is
available from Jeff Kushan, Office of Legislative and International Affairs, c/o
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, Box 4, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
Washington, D.C., 20231. The legal analysis is also available online from
kushan@pioneer.uspto.gov.
13. Eric C. Woglom & Margaret A. Pierri, U.S. is Unifying Utility Requirements,
NAT'L L.J., Feb. 20, 1995, at C37. The guidelines do not amend or rewrite existing
statutory or legal requirements for compliance with the utility requirement. Rather, they
articulate the legal standards that are to be applied to the examination of biotechnology
applications in accordance with existing law. Id at C38. Although the guidelines are
clear, they do not carry the force of law and their impact on patent examination
procedure will only be known in time.
14. Under the new guidelines, the fact that a drug is in human clinical trials will
satisfy the utility requirement because in order for a drug to be in clinical trials the FDA
has to have deemed the drug worthy of further study. However, as explained in the text
accompanying notes 48-60, considerable time and expense is involved just to reach the
point where one can begin such trials and patent protection may be needed to reach that
point.
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if the position seemingly adopted by the PTO can be articulated and
understood, it cannot be justified. The utility requirement, as presently
applied to pharmaceutical patents, is inimical to the public interest and
inconsistent with the statutory objectives of our patent system.

II.

A.

WHAT UTILITY REQUIREMENT?

Statutory Basis for Utility Rejections; The Utility Requirement in
the Case Law

What is the statutory basis for the utility requirement in the patent law
and is it being applied appropriately? The utility requirement is found
in 35 U.S.C. § 101. That section states that a process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter or any improvement thereof must
be "useful" in order for the inventor to obtain a patent. 15 The origin
of the requirement is rooted in the Constitution, which expressed the
mandate of the patent system "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts." 16
Historically, according to the case law, the utility requirement was not
difficult to satisfy. A case from the early 1800s established a de
minimis requirement and stressed that "[a]ll that the law requires is, that
the invention should not be frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good
policy, or sound, morals of society. The word 'useful', therefore, is
incorporated into the act in contradistinction to mischievous or immoral. 17
In 1966, a different paradigm was developed by the United States
Supreme Court in Brenner v. Manson. 18 The Manson Court held that
the application in question did not satisfy the requirement, reasoning that
the chemical intermediates for which patent protection was sought were
to be used to prepare compounds with no known use. 19 Accordingly,
such intermediates should only be patentable if they could provide some
"specific benefit ... in currently available form." 20

15.
16.
17.
(Story,

18.
19.
20.

35 u.s.c. § 101 (1988).
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568)
J.).
383 U.S. 519 (1966) .
Id
Id at 535.
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Somewhat like the Supreme Court's definition of pornography ("I
know it when I see it"), 21 the Manson Court neither told us what utility
is nor what the proper standard of utility should be. 22 However, by
holding that research use did not constitute patentable utility, Manson
legitimized the continued use of the statutory utility requirement as a
potentially powerful basis for rejecting patent applications.
In 1980, the patent office revisited the question of practical utility as
it pertained to the patentability of new steroids in Nelson v. Bowler. 23
The Nelson application described new compounds and made reference
to the use of similar compounds in certain therapeutic applications, such
as in the induction of labor. 24 At issue in Nelson was whether a
showing of practical utility was demonstrated by showing the results of
certain in vitro (laboratory) tests as well as certain in vivo (animal)
tests. 25
The PTO's Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (the Board)
characterized Nelson's tests as "rough screens, uncorrelated with actual
utility."26 Accordingly, the Nelson application was rejected on the
ground that the utility requirement had not been met. On appeal, the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (the CCPA) held that tests
evidencing pharmacological activity may manifest a practical utility even
though they may not establish a specific therapeutic use. 27 The court
concluded, in dicta, that every case is to be determined on its specific
facts and a reasonable correlation between observed properties and
suggested uses is sufficient to establish a practical utility.
In the 1985 case of Cross v. Iizuka, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit 28 reasoned that due to the fact that prior rulings had
found results of animal testing sufficient to establish practical utility, the
results of in vitro tests should also be accepted. 29 Holding that the

21. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
22. Justice Fortas, writing for the majority, said, "We express no view as to the
patentability of a process whose sole demonstrated utility is to yield a product shown to
inhibit the growth of tumors in laboratory animals." Manson, 383 U.S. at 531 n.17.
23. 626 F.2d 853 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
24. Id at 854-55.
25. Specifically, demonstration of a compound's stimulation of smooth muscle
tissue from gerbil colons and modulation of blood pressure in rats. Id at 855.
26. Id at 856.
27. Id.
28. The Federal Circuit was established in 1982 with exclusive jurisdiction over
patent appeals; prior to its establishment these matters were considered by the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA). See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal
Circuit: A Case Study in SpecializedCourts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989). Throughout
the text of this Comment, reference will be made to decisions made by the Federal
Circuit or the CCPA, as appropriate.
29. Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040 (Fed. Cir, 1985).
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utility requirement had been met by in vitro testing, the Cross court
explained that "[s]uccessful in vitro testing will marshal resources and
direct the expenditure of effort to further in vivo testing of the most
potent compounds, thereby providing an immediate benefit to the
public."30
Cross involved a system where in vitro tests were widely recognized
as useful surrogates for in vivo testing. In other words, another scientist
working in this field could make meaningful predictions about the
behavior of these compounds in animals based solely on the results of
laboratory testing. In that respect, the decision can be read quite
narrowly to apply only to classes of well established compounds for
which a voluminous body of scientific data and experience exists. Thus,
this is not established precedent for overcoming the practical utility
requirement in pioneering areas of research on new therapeutic
compounds or for use of established compounds in treating new diseases.
For therapeutic compositions directed towards new or historically
intractable medical challenges, the utility requirement may still be
construed to require convincing data from human clinical trials.
Recently, the Board considered an application that claimed therapeutic
uses of 3 '-fluoro-2, 6-diaminopurine-2' ,3 '-dideoxyriboside (FddDAPR)
or 3'-fluoro-2,3'-dideoxyguanosine (FddGuo). 31 The patent examiner
took issue with the assertion that the compounds would be useful for
treating AIDS, AIDS-related diseases, and other retroviral diseases in
humans. 32 In the specification, in vitro activity of the compounds was
shown. The compounds reduced the cytopathic effect on infected T
(lymphocytic) cells and inhibited the expression of HIV antigen in
infected human cells. In other words, the compounds showed promising
activity against the AIDS virus in laboratory tests. 33 Nonetheless, the
patent examiner reasoned (and the Board agreed) that, at the time of
disclosure, experts in the field were not sure whether one could
30. Id at 1051. Cross provided a three-prong test to apply when considering
patentable utility. First, identify the utility described in the application (the stated
utility). Then, consider whether the stated utility comports with the practical utility
requirement of§ 101, as defined by prior decisions. Finally, determine, with respect to
the stated utility, whether the disclosure in the specification is sufficient to meet the
enablement requirement of§ 112. Id at 1044.
31. ExparteBalzarini, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1892, 1894 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int.
1991).
32. Id. at 1895.
33. Id at 1894.
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extrapolate from any in vitro results to clinical efficacy. 34 Therefore,
a more convincing showing of utility (that is, human clinical testing)
would be required to overcome this rejection. 35
A review of the case law reveals a fairly consistent pattern of
examiners rejecting applications for failure to provide convincing (that
is, human clinical) data to support the utility requirement for patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 101. This pattern has been traced back to the
Manson decision rendered by the United States Supreme Court in 1966.
Manson may have been read too broadly because the Manson application
contained no statement of intended use whatsoever. Moreover, Manson
involved chemical intermediates used in research and had little or
nothing to do with human therapeutics. Although these distinctions have
not been appreciated by the PTO or the Board, the Federal Circuit (and
its predecessor, the CCPA) has repeatedly explained that rejections
entered for lack of human clinical data are proper only where no utility
other than as a treatment for humans is suggested by the applicant. The
Federal Circuit has also explained that safety and effectiveness, per se,
are not concerns of the PTO. Given that the PTO is to apply the patent
law as it is provided in the statutes (35 U.S.C.) and the regulations (37
C.F.R.), as those laws are interpreted by prior court decisions, how is the
PTO's application of the utility requirement to be explained? Is the
PTO applying the law, as it understands it, or is it engaging in an
extrajudicial construction of the law to promote its vision of public
policy objectives? An answer to this question may be found in the
policies and procedures formally adopted by the PTO.
B.

The 1995 Patent Office Guidelines

Patent examiners review patent applications and determine patentability within the context of the statutory requirements, as those requirements
are interpreted and developed by the PTO's own set of internal
guidelines. These guidelines are set forth in the Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure (MPEP). 36 The utility requirement is discussed
in Section 608.0l(p) of the MPEP (and cases cited therein). 37

34. Id at 1895.
35. Id at 1897.
36. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE (rev. ed. 1994) [hereinafter MPEP].
37. Id at 600-40 to 600-42. It should be noted that the utility guidelines of the
MPEP have been the subject of some criticism. At least one commentator has noted that
the PTO's approach to utility, as set forth in the MPEP, is without statutory basis,
ignores established precedents, "discourag[es] or delay[s] a patent application[,] and ...
imped[es] dissemination of information." Mirabel, supra note 9, at 812,822. Mirabel
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It is within the MPEP that the full implications of the utility
requirement are to be found. Examiners are directed to request clinical
evidence of pharmaceutical effectiveness in humans when exclusively
human utility is disclosed in the patent application. 38 Where those
skilled in pharmacology would accept animal tests as correlating with
human utility, clinical data from humans is not required. 39
Where the claimed utility is so unbelievable as to provoke skepticism
among others skilled in the art, the examiner is instructed to reject the
application for failure to disclose a practical utility unless adequate proof
of utility is provided. 40 Certain claimed utilities, such as cures for
cancer or hair restoration, have been termed "incredible utilities."41
However, much progress has been made in the fight against cancer and
several effective approaches are now recognized. 42 Similarly, now that
Rogaine™ has been approved for use in hair restoration, 43 baldness
cures can no longer be considered per se incredible.
Nonetheless, certain patent claims are still considered incredible. A
recent application claimed a method for slowing the aging process. 44
In affirming the patent examiner's rejection on utility grounds, the
federal circuit determined that "the nature of the asserted utility is so
incredible as to create a strong presumption of inoperativeness. Ergo,

argues that "[t]he trivialization of [basic tenets of our patent system] ... has allowed a
change in the meaning of 'useful' to go largely unnoticed." Id. at 811. According to
Mirabel, the problem with this change is that uses of chemical compounds are not easily
nailed down or defined with precision, so an overemphasis on a legalistic definition of
utility forces applicants to develop contrived uses or conceal information that could
benefit the public. Id. at 814, 822.
38. MPEP, supra note 36, at 600-41.
39. Id. "Where the disclosed in vitro utility is supplemented by the similar in vitro
and in vivo pharmacological activity of structurally similar compounds, the in vitro
utility is sufficient to comply with the practical utility requirement ...." MPEP, supra
note 36, § 608.0l(p) (citing Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
40. Id. at 600-42. Also, examiners are instructed that "[w]here the claimed
compounds are capable of several different utilities and one use is adequately described
... , additional utilities will be investigated for compliance with [the utility requirement,
and failure to meet this requirement] may result in a requirement to cancel such
additional utilities." Id.
41. See, e.g., 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS §§ 4.04[1], [2][b] (1995).
42. See, e.g., Ex parte Busse, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1908, 1909 (Bd. Pat. App. &
Int. 1986) (stating in dicta that cancer cures are no longer per se "incredible").
43. See Upjohn Co. v. Medtron Lab., Inc., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1195, 1196
(S.D.N.Y. 1992).
44. Ex parte Heicklen, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1463, 1463 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int.
1990).
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very clear evidence is required to overcome the presumption of
inoperativeness. " 45
It has been suggested that the utility requirement is being applied more
rigorously with biotechnology or pharmaceutical applications than for
patent applications in more traditional fields. 46 Utility rejections may
appear to single out biotechnology or pharmaceutical applications
because these applications tend to assert utilities for which a prima facie
showing of utility is not possible. It may simply be that because
biotechnology is still a new field, it is less predictable than other fields.
Therefore, it is more difficult to prove to a patent examiner that a given
biotechnology invention will work as intended. Indeed, as one
commentator noted in another context (computer patents), "A computer
program either works or it doesn't work. You don't need the certification of your peers to prove that."47

III.' THE

HYPOTHETICALS

This section will develop two hypothetical examples of inventors who
are striving to obtain patent protection for their research. These
hypotheticals will demonstrate some of the potential problems that the
utility requirement creates for inventors. These hypotheticals will also
provide a context for the discussion that comprises the remainder of this
Comment.

A.

Hypothetical One

A scientist discovers an exciting new compound that she believes will
be useful in the· treatment of cancer. She determines the chemical
properties of this compound, determines its activity in a variety of
laboratory tests, and then demonstrates anti-tumor activity in experimental animal models. She plans to commercialize this compound as a new
cure for cancer.
To bring a product like this to market requires additional testing in the
laboratory to confirm her hypothesis, optimization of the methods of
producing the compound, production of a quantity on a more or less
"industrial" scale (as compared to laboratory scale) of the compound to
be used in clinical trials, and enough results from the clinical trials to

45. Id at 1465-66.
46. See Noonan, supra note 9, at 276 (arguing that "[u]tility of electromechanical
discoveries usually is presumed, whereas utility in pharmaceutical cases must be clearly
stated and often proved").
47. Jube Shiver, Jr., Low-TechProblemswithHigh-TechPatents,L.A. TIMES, Jan.
9, 1994, at Dl.
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convince the FDA that this compound is safe and effective for its
proposed use in hurnans. 48
Realizing that this undertaking will likely require from ten to twelve
years of development and testing and anywhere from 100 to 150 million
dollars in development costs, the scientist needs to secure adequate
financing for this effort. 49 Accordingly, she seeks patent protection for
her invention so as to make this opportunity more attractive to investors
and also to enable her to publicize her findings in order to bring this
opportunity to the attention of investors.50 On the basis of the completed laboratory testing, together with the results of the animal tests, she
files an application with the PTO. Months later she receives word from
the PTO that her application has been denied because the invention that
she attempted to claim is not "useful" and, therefore, fails to meet the
utility requirement. 51 Her patent attorney 52 explains that this is a

48. See generally Veronica Henry, Problems with Pharmaceutical Regulation in
the United States, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 617 (1993); Mary T. Griffin, AIDS Drugs & the
Pharmaceutical Industry: A Need/or Reform, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 363 (1991).
49. See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Research-BasedPharmaceuticalCompanies: The
Needfor Improved P,atent Protection Worldwide, 2 J.L. & TECH. 307, 308 ( 1987) (citing
Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Association statistics); see also Henry, supra note 48, at
617; BIO Report, supra note 11, at 13.
50. See BIO Report, supra note 11, at 3-4, citing a study by Dr. David Austin,
fellow at Resources for the Future, which underscores the importance of patent protection
to commercial viability for the biotechnology industry. The Austin study estimated that
a patent itself is worth about $200,000 to a biotechnology company, but that factors
associated with the patent grant increase the market value of the firm holding the patent
by over $800,000. Dr. Austin's study suggests that "[p]atents give investors confidence
and influence their willingness to put their capital at risk." Id. See generally Dan L.
Burk, Biotechnology and Patent Law: Fitting Innovation to the Procrustean Bed, 17
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. l, 22 (1991).
51. The process of taking an invention from patent application to issue is generally
referred to as patent prosecution. This process typically involves an exchange of
correspondence between the inventor (or attorney for the inventor) and the patent office
(through a patent examiner assigned to the particular case). Generally speaking, the
patent examiner will respond to an application by sending the applicant an "office
action" that involves objections, rejections, and requirements that must be addressed or
met in order for a patent to be allowable. It is in this office action that our inventor in
the hypothetical will likely learn that specific aspects ("claims") of her invention have
been rejected by the examiner for failure to meet the statutory requirement of utility.
For an overview of the prosecution process and a more detailed description of patent
examination procedure, see, e.g., DAVID A. BURGE, PATENT AND TRADEMARK TACTICS
AND PRACTICE ch. 6 (2d ed. 1984).
52. Patent prosecution is a specialized practice oflaw. Although an inventor can
appear before the PTO prose, only registered attorneys or agents authorized to practice
before the PTO can handle such matters on behalf of inventors. 37 C.F.R. § 1.31
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common response from the PTO and can be expected whenever a
discovery is so unique, or its intended use so unprecedented, that it
would not be immediately apparent to other scientists in the field 53 that
the discovery would do what the applicant/inventor claims it will do. 54
She is advised to keep her discovery quiet and continue experimentation
until more results can be submitted to bolster her claims.
Alternatively, she can attempt to convince the PTO of the merits of
her position and, upon receiving a final rejection, she can appeal the
decision. 55 Initially, the appeal will be heard by the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences. 56 If rejection by the examiner is affirmed
by the Board, the inventor can appeal to the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. 57 The appeal process can be expensive and time
consuming. 58 Moreover, there is no guarantee that she will ever prevail
on the merits of her patentability arguments.
To protect her patent rights she must keep her discovery a secret,
disclosing it to potential investors only under a confidentiality agreement. 59 She can only hope that before she is in a position to file a
more detailed patent application, someone else does not independently

(1995).
53. Scientists in the field are considered to be "persons having ordinary skill in the
art," also referred to as "PHOSITA."
54. See, e.g., I CHISUM, supra note 41, § 4.04[2]. For a definition of this mythical
person of ordinary skill in the art, see John 0. Tresansky, PHOSITA-The Ubiquitous
andEnigmaticPersoninPatentLaw, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 37 (1991).
At the public hearing in San Diego, Jerry Caulder, C.E.O. of Mycogen Corporation,
remarked that, in essence, the PTO treats this "PHOSITA" as a person with a rather
striking schizophrenic.quality: "For obviousness determinations under 35 U.S.C. § 103
he's a genius, but for enablement purposes under § 112 he's an imbecile." Public
Hearing, supra note 10.
55. For a description of the appeal process for patent decisions, see generally 3
CHISUM, supra note 41, § 11.06. The relevant law related to the appeal process is found
in 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.191-. 198 (I 995) (corresponding code provisions are also found in 35
u.s.c. § 134 (1988)).
56. 37 C.F.R. § l.19l(a) (1995). The Board is an integral part of the PTO and is
comprisedofthe Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, the AssistantCommissioners,
and examiners-in-chief. Any such appeal will be heard by at least three members of the
Board, as designated by the Commissioner. 35 U.S.C. § 7 (1988).
57. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 28, at 3-4.
58. BIO estimates indicate an average pendency of approximately IO years for
biotechnology applications on appeal. BIO Report, supra note 11, at 196.
59. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 to understand the impact of various forms of disclosure
(including, interalia, advertising, publication, or offer for sale in the United States) on
patentability. The full ramifications of a disclosure differ somewhat in a first-to-file
jurisdiction, such as Europe, compared to the United States' first-to-invent approach to
determining priority of invention. Although these distinctions are beyond the scope of
this Comment, the utility requirement has been discussed in connection with patent
harmonization and the potential for changes in the way the PTO determines priority.
See, e.g., Ludlam & Feldbaum, supra note 4.
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make the same discovery and choose to publish it. In that case, she may
not be able to secure patent protection and the chance of her compound
ever becoming a commercial success is therefore diminished, if not
extinguished. 60

B.

Hypothetical Two

Meanwhile, another scientist in the same field discovers an unrelated
compound that, like the compound described earlier, shows promise for
treatment of cancer. This inventor also dreams of commercial success
and files a patent on the compound and a method for making the
compound. Fortunately for this inventor, his patent attorney advises him
early on of the importance of demonstrating a practical utility for this
claimed invention. As a result, in addition to the studies aimed at
characterizing the anti:..cancer properties of this compound, this inventor
searches the literature for other properties of related compounds and
discovers that other compounds with a somewhat similar structure have
been shown to be potent herbicides. Testing confirms his hypothesis and
an application is filed, claiming general properties of the compound, its
method of preparation, and a specific use of the compound to kill weeds.
This application is approved, a patent is granted, and the inventor has
now been granted twenty-year monopoly, measured from the date of
filing, during which time no one else can make, use, or sell this
compound in the United States. 61
Thus, the inventor in Hypothetical Two has no more clinical evidence
of his compound's cancer-fighting properties than does the inventor in
Hypothetical One, yet he can obtain a patent because of the compound's
other practical utilities.

a

60.

For the correlation between patent protection and commercial success, see, e.g.,

C.T. TAYLOR & Z.A. SILBERSTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PATENT SYSTEM

331-36 (1973).
61. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). A 17-year term was available for applications filed
before June 8, 1995. The clock started running on the date the patent was granted. For
applications filed after that date, the patent term is 20 years from the date of filing.
Many worry that if the United States changes the determination of priority of invention
from the first-to-invent approach used presently to the first-to-file approach used in other
countries, combined with the recent change to the 20-yearterm, our inventors will have
even less protection. This is because in that scenario, pendency periods in the FDA and
in the PTO could combine to virtually extinguish the term of a patent before it is even
issued.
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By this point, it should be clear that there is a problem with the utility
requirement, but just how big a problem the utility requirement
represents would appear to depend upon the type of invention for which
patent protection is sought. For someone working in a more or less
traditional field, building on the work of others and making advances in
this established field, there is less reason for the PTO to doubt the
asserted utility claims and it is less likely that it will reject a patent
application on that basis. Likewise, if an individual is working with new
compositions chemically or structurally related to established compounds62 for which experience with these related compounds supports
inferences of utility, the utility requirement need not represent a
formidable barrier to patenting the new compound. 63 However, if one
has identified a truly novel composition, the only identifiable utility for
that compound is a therapy for disease in humans, and there are no
recognized laboratory tests or animal models to support testing of this
compound, then nothing short of human clinical trials may satisfy the
utility requirement. Thus, the highly contextualized nature of modem
patent practice may provide a simple explanation for how commentators
and practitioners can disagree over the relative significance of the utility
requirement. Assuming, arguendo, that the utility requirement can be
problematic, the question becomes whether there are steps that can be
taken to circumvent this problem.

IV.

THE "ALTERNATIVES"

This section will discuss four methods that have been widely used in
order to circumvent the utility requirement and the many problems the
utility requirement presents.

A.

Demonstrate Uses Other Than as a Human Therapeutic Agent

The approach exemplified in Hypothetical Two basically involves
anticipation of utility rejections for lack of clinical utility and preemption
of those rejections by laying claim to other potentially less profitable,
but more readily demonstrable, uses for a claimed invention. This may
be the simplest way to deal with utility rejections, assuming that another
use can be demonstrated. In Hypothetical Two, our inventor found that
not only did his new compound show potential utility as an anti-cancer

62.
63.

Such compounds are known as homologs or congeners.

See, e.g., Virginia M. McGuffey, Note, Paten/ability ofChemical Compounds:
A Comparison of the Utility Requirement as Applied to Chemical Intermediates and the
Nonobviousness Requirement as Applied to Structurally Obvious Compounds, 10 GA.
L. REV. 1025 (1976).
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agent, it also killed weeds. The use of this compound as an herbicide
should satisfy the utility requirement and a patent grant may be obtained
covering both the compound itself and its use as an herbicide. 64
This approach was illustrated in the 1964 case of In re Gottlieb. 65
Gottlieb claimed.a new compound with three uses: as a plant fungicide,
for treatment of certain types of infection in humans, and as a bovine
abortifacient. 66 The CCPA held that because the use of this compound
as a plant fungicide was not "incredible ... or ... misleading[,]" the
practical utility requirement had been met and, absent any other statutory
bars to patentability, Gottlieb should receive his patent, even though the
other proposed uses had not been demonstrated. 67
This approach to satisfying the utility requirement has been successfully employed in a number of the newer biotechnology-based pharmaceutical applications. For example, monoclonal antibodies represent potent
research tools to investigate and better understand the basic mechanisms
of disease progression in cancer patients. 68 Many researchers surmised
that the exquisite specificity of these antibodies could be harnessed to
create more effective therapies for cancer. 69 Research in this area
typically involved a somewhat circular approach of developing the
antibodies to identify cancer-specific markers and using reactivity with

64. Due to the enablement requirement of § 112, only the use that has been
demonstrated can be claimed. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (discussed infra notes 160-68 and
accompanying text). However, because a patent can be obtained for the compound itself,
any use of that compound is protected by the owner of the patent for the compound.
The patent grant includes the right to "exclude others from making, using, or selling the
invention throughout the United States." 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988) (emphasis added).
65. 328 F.2d 1016 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
·
.
66. Id. at 1017.
67. Id. at 1019. The court noted that there seemed to be no contention on the part
of the examiner that the use of the claimed compound as an anti-fungal agent was not
believable and that the Board's consideration on appeal seemed to ignore this use and
focus instead on "human aspects of the alleged utility." Id.
68. See, e.g., GEORGE L. WRIGHT, JR., MONOCLONAL ANTIBODIES AND CANCER
(1984). Monoclonal antibodies were first described in 1976 by Drs. Kohler and Milstein,
a landmark achievement for which a Nobel Prize in medicine was awarded. Georges
Kohler & Cesar Milstein, Continuous Cultures of Fused Cells Secreting Antibody of
Predefined Specificity, 256 NATURE 495 (1975).
·
69. See, e.g., JANIS KUBY, IMMUNOLOGY 141-55 (1992); see also R.L. Saunders
et al., Monoclonal Antibodies: Advances in in Vivo and in Vitro Diagnostics, 38
PATHOLOGY 638 (1984).
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these markers to define the antibodies. 70 The use of the antibodies to
identify cancer cells (that is, to diagnose the disease) was relatively
simple to demonstrate;7' however, the use of these antibodies, either
alone or in more sophisticated ways, to "cure" cancer was another matter
altogether. 72 Many applications have been filed and patents issued
claiming the antibodies and the use of the antibodies to detect cancer
cells, but only within the text or the specification of the application will
one find broader assertions of the use of these compounds in the
management of the disease.
This approach to satisfying the utility requirement is necessarily
predicated upon the patentability of the composition, in this case, the
antibody itself. As techniques for generating these antibodies become
more predictable, one may expect to encounter rejections based on
obviousness73 rather than utility grounds. 74 At that point, an investigator in the monoclonal antibody-based cancer therapy field finds
himself in the position of our investigator in Hypothetical One, whose
only hope for gaining patent protection hinges on generating convincing
clinical data.
Alzheimer's disease is currently the subject of intensive investigation.
It is the fourth leading cause of death in adults in the United States
today, claiming 100,000 lives each year. 75 Current estimates suggest

70. See, e.g., In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining how
antibodies are made and characterized).
71. See, e.g., E. Dale Sevier et al., MonoclonalAntibodiesin Clinicallmmunology,
27 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 1797 (1981).
72. Although monoclonal antibodies were described nearly 20 years ago and
researchers in a number of government, academic, and corporate institutions have
devoted literally hundreds, if not thousands, of person-years to these projects, there has
thus far been no monoclonal antibody-based cancer therapy approved for use in the
management of disease in humans. Two monoclonal antibody therapy products have
been approved to date for use in humans: Ortho Biotech's OKT3 (used to prevent
rejection in kidney transplantation) and Burroughs Wellcome' s Digibind (used to remove
toxic levels of digitalis from the bloodstream). Paul Abrams, Have Monoclonals
FulfilledTheir Promise?, 11 BIO/TECH. 156, 157 (1993). (Mr. Abrams is president and
C.E.O. of NeoRx, a biotechnology company headquartered in Seattle, Washington.)
73. Per 35 U.S.C § 103, a patent may not be obtained if "the differences between
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter
as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art." 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988) (emphasis added).
74. This was, in fact, the holding in Ex parte Erlich, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1463,
1466-67 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1992), where the Board held that since a particular
antigen (human fibroblast interferon) was known, and techniques for generating
monoclonal antibodies were known, it was prima facie obvious to generate these specific
antibodies.
75. Khalid Iqbal, Prevalence and Neurobiology of Alzheimer's Disease: Some
Highlights, in ALZHEIMER' s DISEASE: BASIC MECHANISMS, DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPEUTIC STRATEGIES 1, 1 (Khalid Iqbal et al. eds., 1991).
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that the number of afflicted individuals will double by the year 2000 and
quintuple by the year 2040. 76
Alzheimer's disease may well be the "the disease of the century."77
No one knows what causes.the disease, who will contract it, or how to
manage (treat or cure) it once it occurs. There are no generally accepted
animal models of the disease78 and the currently available methods of
diagnosing the disease are not satisfactory. 79
Naturally, the prediction that a large proportion of the population can
expect to suffer from an incurable and ultimately fatal disease has
alarming implications for us all. In addition to the individual concerns
that we or our loved ones will contract the disease, there is a broader
social cost to be considered. An estimated thirty-nine billion dollars was
budgeted in 1986 for the care of persons in nursing homes, with more
than half of the residents of these homes living there because they suffer
from some form of dementia. 80
A number of biochemically distinctive features (biological markers)
of Alzheimer's disease have been identified. For example, the brains of
afflicted individuals display distinctive morphologic changes81 compared to normal brains, and proteins specific to these features, designated
"A-beta" and "tau", have been identified. 822 Applications have been

76. Id These estimates simply reflect the increase in the number of people
normally at risk for Alzheimer's disease, namely, those individuals aged 70 and over that
will naturally increase dramatically as the "baby boomer" generation reaches their golden
years. Leonard Berg & John C. Morris, Aging and Dementia, in NEUROBIOLOGY OF
DISEASE 299 (Alan L. Pearlman & Robert C. Collins eds., 1990).
77. Berg & Morris, supra note 76, at 299 (estimating that more than 2.5 million
people in the United States alone will be suffering from Alzheimer's disease by the year
2030). Ironically, although therapeutics for diseases such as Alzheimer's are desperately
needed, it is these diseases for which this higher standard of clinical utility can be
difficult to meet. BIO Report, supra note 11, at 68.
78. See generallyKatrin Bothe et al., ProgressiveEncephalopathyand Myopathy
in Transgenic Mice Expressing Human Foamy Virus Genes, 253 Ser. 555 (1991); D.O.
Wirak et al., Deposits ofAmyloid Protein in the Central Nervous System of Transgenic
Mice, 253 Ser. 323 (1991) (reporting that, although no naturally occurring animal
systems exist, new genetically engineered "transgenic" animals show promise).
79. See Iqbal, supra note 75, at 1 (explaining that a brain biopsy is the only
available diagnostic test for Alzheimer's disease).
80.. Berg & Morris, supra note 76, at 299.
81. Such markers are commonly known as "plaques" and "tangles".
82. Berg & Morris, supra note 76, at 299; see also George G. Glenner, M.D. and
Caine W. Wong, Alzheimer 'sDisease: Initial Report of the Purification and Characterization of a Novel CerebrovascularAmyloid Protein, 120 BIOCHEM. & BIOPHYS. RES.
COMM. 885 (1984); Colin L. Masters et al., Amyloid Plaque Core Protein in Alzheimer's
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filed claiming purified preparations of these markers and the use of the
markers in the diagnosis of the disease. 83 Although the rational nexus
between the presence of these markers and the onset of disease remains
to be determined (that is, do these markers cause the disease or does the
disease result in generation of these markers?), it is reasonable to assume
that, provided the markers cause or hasten the progression of the disease,
removing these markers, or preventing their formation, will confer some
therapeutic benefit. As with the asserted anti-cancer properties of
monoclonal antibodies, these uses are routinely hinted at in Alzheimer's
composition claims, but appear only in the specification of the patent. 84
As the foregoing should make clear, filing applications that state more
than one utility, only one of which can be demonstrated, can be an
effective way to meet the utility requirement and obtain patent protection
on new compositions. This approach is necessarily predicated upon
finding a demonstrable use and it is of no benefit in overcoming utility
rejections on applications that only claim a method of use in treating
humans.
Patents can be granted for new uses of known compounds. If a
compound has already been patented by one person and the use of the
compound is patented by another, then the "composition" patent
dominates the "use" patent and the inventor of the use cannot practice
his invention without permission of the inventor of the composition.
Conversely, the inventor of the composition cannot use his composition
in the manner described by the inventor of the use without his permission. Either or both may decide to grant a license of their patent rights
to the other, in which case both inventors may derive economic benefit
from their collective inventions. 85

Disease and Down Syndrome, 82 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 4245 (1985); Dennis
J. Selkoe et al., Isolation ofLow-Molecular-WeightProteinsfromAmyloidPlaque Fibers
in Alzheimer's Disease, 46 J. NEUROCHEM. 1820 (1986).
83. See, e.g., United States Patent No. 5,213,962 (1993) [hereinafter '962 Patent].
84. See, e.g., id. The '962 Patent had 30 claims, including five independent
method claims to diagnose or detect neurodegenerative conditions in humans. The
abstract of the patent recites these uses in the diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease and goes
on to say that "pharmaceutical preparations . . . [and] [m]edical uses for the pharmaceutical preparations are ... disclosed." Id. (in Abstract). Buried within the Summary of
the Invention can be found the following potential use of the claimed subject matter:
"Pharmaceutical compositions for use in any of the methods ... are also provided ...."
Id. at col. 2, 1.66.
85. For example, A discovers a cure for the common cold and patents the process
for making, as well as using, the compound to treat cold sufferers. Then B discovers
that topical application of a powdered version of A's compound combats skin infections.
B can obtain a patent on this new use of the pill. A and B have every reason to work
together towards a mutually beneficial cross-licensing agreement (paraphrased from
Lawrence R. Velvel, A Critique a/Brenner vs. Manson, 49 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y. 5, 8
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Attempts to claim a new use for an existing compound necessarily
depend upon a demonstration of this new use; the compound itself
cannot be claimed because it is known. For example, Ziduvidine (AZT),
the only drug presently approved for treatment of AIDS, was developed
and patented in the 1960s for use as an anti-cancer drug. 86 The
composition patent expired. Subsequently, an application was filed by
another researcher claiming the use of AZT to combat AIDS. This
patent, held by Burroughs-Wellcome, was granted in 1988. 87 Thus, a
patentable use of a known compound was found where such new use
was reasonably demonstrated to the satisfaction of the examiner.
Another recent application, considered in Ex parte Balzarini, 88 also
claimed the use of certain compounds in the treatment of AIDS and
other retro viral diseases. Claims to the compound itself (F ddGuo) were
rejected for lack of novelty. 89 The inventor had to convince the
examiners that the compound could be used to treat humans infected
with AIDS or related viruses in order to obtain patent protection. The
examiner was evidently unpersuaded and the inventor's claims were
rejected. On appeal, the Board affirmed the examiner and seemed to
place considerable weight on the overall pessimism in the field of AIDS
research that meaningful predictions about in vivo activity could be made
from in vitro tests. 90 The Board did suggest that the examiner's
concern over side-effects (safety issues) was misplaced and not
"particularly relevant to the present inquiry."91 The adequacy of
disclosure of clinical utility, which was speculative in the Balzarini

(1967)).
86. Evan Ackiron, Patents/or Critical Pharmaceuticals: The AZT Case, 17 AM.
J.L. & MED. 145, 166 (1991).
87. United States Patent No. 4,724,232 (1988). This patent included 24 claims,
including four independent claims to methods for treating humans with AIDS or ARC
(AIDS-Related Complex). Id
88. 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1892, 1894 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1991).
89. Id at 1898-99. Composition claims were anticipated by the independent work
of another inventor, Zajtseva. Id Zajtseva received the Russian equivalent of a patent,
USSR's Inventor's Cert. No. 1,053,474, in 1985. Id at 1894.
90. The examiner had drawn an analogy to another antiviral compound, suramin,
that exhibited the same sort of properties shown by Balzarini's compound (that is, the
inhibition of growth of virus-infected cells and the reduction in viral antigen expression
in infected cells) yet was too toxic to be used in human therapy. Id at 1895-97.
91. Id at 1895 n.3. The Board suggested that such concerns were more properly·
left to "the appropriate medical regulating authorities and/or to the treating physician."

Id
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application, distinguishes it from the Burroughs-Wellcome AZT
application. 92
Even where more than one utility is asserted, and at least one utility
can be demonstrated, the approach outlined in this section of the
Comment may fail to provide adequate protection for inventors. If
assertions of utility are "incredible" or "misleading," the examiner has
the authority to require that these assertions be excluded from the
specification. 93
Some applications (Gottlieb's, 94 for example) have survived the
Board's scrutiny of incredible or misleading claims. Other applicants
have not fared as well and the court's rationale for demanding that
speculative assertions of utility be removed appears· to be based on
considerations of enablement95 as well as persistent concerns over
safety and effectiveness. For example, the patent application considered
in Ex parte Moore 96 claimed the use of a new compound as an
herbicide and as an inhibitor of yeast. Moore had little difficulty
convincing the patent office of the. claimed utilities; however, the
specification contained broad assertions as to potential anti-cancer
activity of this compound. The Board, nearly a quarter of a century
after the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act97 was passed, asserted its duty
to protect the public from untested drugs:
[l]t is the duty of [the patent office] to look with great care into allegations of
utility and particularly those of a medical nature and to refuse to issue the patent
ifit believes that such allegations are misleading .... [W]e are convinced that
... members of the public [would conclude from reading the Moore
specification] that the claimed compounds possess utility in the treatment of
cancer in humans. 98

92. Supra note 87.
93. 1 CHISUM, supra note 41, § 4.04[4], at 4-42. This was emphasized in dicta by
the Gottlieb court. Specifically, the court cautioned: "Our present holding is not to be
construed as precluding the Patent Office from making such requirements as to correction
or cancellation of those statements as may be appropriate." In re Gottlieb, 328 F.2d
1016, 1019-20 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
94. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 160-68 and accompanying text.
96. 128 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 8 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1960).
97. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
98. Moore, 128 U.S.P.Q. at 10. The court found support for this position in an
earlier case, in which it said:
Great care and scrutiny should be particularly taken in connection with
applications for medical patents. While the granting of a patent does not
legally constitute a certificate that the medicine to which it relates is a good
medicine and will cure the disease ... , nevertheless, the granting of such a
patent gives a kind of official imprimatur to the medicine in question on which
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In a more recent case, In re Hozumi, 99 the patent office again
expressed concern over allowing speculative claims to remain in a patent
specification. Group Director Charles Van Hom of the patent office
explained that "it is appropriate for the Office to require removal of
wildly speculative statements ... [to] avoid misleading the public." 100
Who is this "public" that the patent office believes needs
protection from these "wildly speculative statements"? The patent office
cannot be overly concerned about defrauding the public at large because
therapeutic compositions, such as those described in Hozumi, require
FDA approval before they can be used in humans and even then these
compositions are used under the direct supervision of trained medical
personnel. 101 The pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries are
sufficiently sophisticated to know that, regardless of what is contained
within the specification of the patent, the real patent grant is to be found
in the claims. It is simply not clear that there remains any legitimate
concern over misleading the public.
It is not apparent from its decisions whether the Board shares the
examining corp's view that it must diligently protect the general public
from any potential misapprehensions vis-a-vis the significance of a
patent grant. It certainly seemed unpersuaded when the Hozumi
application came up on appeal. The Board reversed the examiner's
utility/operability rejections and the composition claims were allowed.
Examiner-in-Chief Goldstein, for the Board, reiterated its earlier position

... some members of the public are likely to rely.

Id at 9 (citing Isenstead v. Watson, 115 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 408,410 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int.
1957).
99. 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 353, 354 (Comm'r PTO 1985).
100. Id.
101. Henry, supra note 48, at 621. Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission and
the Securities and Exchange Commission are responsible for protecting consumers and
shareholders, respectively. Commissioner Van Horn did provide other bases for
requiring removal of more speculative assertions, namely that such statements are
inconsistent with that which is enabled (an issue of scope, discussed infra in text
accompanying notes 160-68) and that, as a matter of policy, the patent office should not
have to spend the time or resources "to provide a scientifically reasoned opinion as to
why these speculative statements would not be believed by a person skilled in this art."
Hozumi, 226 U.S.P.Q. at 355.
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that "it is not necessary that all of the compounds claimed be useful for
every utility disclosed in an application." 102

B.

File Patent Applications in Foreign Countries

One could attempt to circumvent the dilemma described in Hypothetical One by filing patent applications in foreign countries. International
treaties provide a process whereby inventors from participating countries
can file an application in one country, and that filing date will establish
priority of the invention for later filing in another country. 103 Our
investigator in Hypothetical One could file her application with the
European counterpart of the PTO, the European Patent Office (EPO).
The EPO has lower standards for utility so the application will be
examined for priority of invention and compliance with the other major
patentability requirements. 104 The EPO will not grant a patent for
something that purports to operate in a manner clearly inconsistent with
established physical laws, but, unlike recent trends at the PTO, the EPO
appears to accept any "reasonable" statement regarding operability. 105
Thus, filing a patent application with the EPO would appear to
provide our inventor with time to initiate studies towards showing
clinical utility in humans, while preserving patent priority rights in the

102. Ex parte Hozumi, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1059, 1060-61 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int.
1987).
103. 35 U.S.C. § 119 (1988). Under United States law, prior to filing a foreign
application it is necessary to obtain a license from the Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks. This process is virtually automatic when an applicant files in the United
States prior to filing abroad; the U.S. application is deemed to be an implicit request for
a foreign filing license. However,· if a U.S. citizen files in a foreign country before
getting a license or within six months of filing in the United States, sanctions, which
include a statutory bar to getting a patent in the U.S., can be imposed. The foreign filing
license or the six-month grace period are designed to allow the PTO to screen
applications for any material that could be considered a matter of national security. 35
u.s.c. §§ 184, 185 (1988).
104. In the EPO, the utility requirement is framed in terms of whether the invention
in question is capable of industrial application. EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION, art.
52. Industrial application is further defined as anything that "can be made or used in any
kind of industry." Id art. 57. See also STEPHEN A. BENT ET AL., INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY WORLDWIDE (1987); Ron K. Levy, Practical

Considerations of Foreign Filing a "Biotechnology" Related Patent Application, in
GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SERIES 1992: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES-PATENT 177
(Practicing L. Inst. ed., 1992); Ginsberg, Patentabi!ity,supra note 5.
105. BIO Report, supra note 11, at 72. The report goes on to say that the authors
are "aware of no European case where the [EPO] has requested ... human in vivo data."
Id at 73 (emphasis added). Elsewhere in the report it is noted that the EPO standard of
utility is that an invention be "susceptible ofindustrial application," and that this (lower)
standard is commonly met when evaluated in the context of a European application by
the very same examiner who has rejected the U.S. counterpart for lack ofutility. Id. at
49-50.
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United States. However, whereas U.S. applications are not published
until the patent is granted, European applications are published within
eighteen months of filing, whether or not a patent has been granted. 106
When published, these applications are treated as publications and can
be used as prior art to reject later applications, even when filed by the
same inventor. Furthermore, the United States counterpart must be filed
within one year of filing in the EPO or patent rights in the United States
will be lost forever. 107 Thus, this approach will not provide enough
time for our inventor to develop the clinical data required by the PTO.
C.

File a Statutory Invention Registration

Our inventor in Hypothetical One might also choose to explore a
relatively new and little used alternative to patenting as another strategy
to protect her invention. In 1984, Congress established a procedure that
is designated as a statutory invention registration (SIR). 108 This
procedure involves examining an application for enablement under the
criteria of 35 U.S.C. § 112, but no showing of utility is required. 109
An inventor can file an SIR and establish a priority date for his or her
invention, then abandon the SIR and convert it to a patent by timely
filing of a continuation or continuation-in-part application. 110 It has

106.
107.

MPEP, supra note 36, at 1800-46; BIO Report, supra note 11, at 197.
35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b), 119 (1988). Section 102 states:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-

(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this
or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one
year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States ....
§ 102. See also Eric M. Lee, Public Use and On Sale Issues Arising From Clinical
Testing of Medical Devices, J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 364 (1993). Lee's
article, although directed at medical devices, provides an overview of these statutory bars
that applies equally to pharmaceutical compositions as well as such devices.
108. Patent Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622 (codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1988)); 37 C.F.R. § 1.293 (1995).
109. An SIR is not a patent; it does not convey the right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling. In addition, a published SIR (a Statutory Invention Certificate)
is of no commercial value. However, an SIR does ensure that an inventor filing a timely
SIR will not be preempted from practicing her invention by the independent invention
and patenting by another. It is, therefore, a purely defensive device. 35. U.S.C. § 157
(1988); 37 C.F.R. § 1.297 (1995).
110. 37 C.F.R. § 1.60 (1995). For a more detailed description of the SIR process,
see, e.g., Stanley A. Marcus, OtherFormsofProtection,C561 ALI-ABA COURSE STUD.
MATERIALS 47 (1990); see also Wendall R. Guffey, Statutory Invention Registration:
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been suggested that, even though the SIR was designed to provide
defensive patent protection to non-commercial interests, an applicant
could abuse the system by withdrawing the SIR and filing a continuation, thereby obtaining the benefit of an early filing date without the risk
of rejection for filing too early (that is, before sufficient data has been
accumulated to overcome all potential patentability rejections). 111
However, the Commissioner of Patents retains discretion to allow or
deny any petition to withdraw an SIR. 112 More importantly, as with
foreign applications, once an SIR is published it will serve as prior art
against any future patent applications and this process is not likely to
provide an investigator with the extra time needed to complete human
clinical trials. 113

D.

Delay Filing Until Clinical Trials Have Been Completed

If a utility rejection poses a problem for an inventor of certain types
of new pharmaceutical compositions, such as our inventor in Hypothetical One, and the currently available alternatives do not adequately
address this problem, then what is our inventor to do? She can either
abandon her invention or conceal it for the time necessary to develop the
remaining data, while running the risk of preemption and finding a way
around the funding issues explored in Section III.
This approach may be expected to result in a less efficient effort to
commercialize the invention. To make matters worse, the longer the
development takes, the more expensive the undertaking becomes and the
less likely it is that this compound will ever find its way to market.
Society loses the benefit of a timely and complete disclosure of a
potentially important advance in human health care and inventive efforts
go unrewarded.
Recent changes in the patent law evince an appreciation on the part of
the Legislature of the need to foster development of new pharmaceutical
compounds. To better demonstrate the implications of these changes for
the utility requirement, the inventor in Hypothetical Two will be
revisited, illustrating the process as if legislative changes had not been
made. Having secured patent protection, the inventor publicizes his
findings, lines up sufficient venture capital to support clinical testing,
and takes the compound through the same process of testing alluded to

DefensivePatentability, 16 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 291 (1986).
111. Guffey, supra note 110, at 298-99.
112. 37 C.F.R. § 1.296 (1995).
113. If the process takes longer than one year, and it will, the statutory bar under
§ 102 will preclude patentability. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
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earlier. Then, ten to twelve years later, the inventor is granted permission by the FDA to market the drug for use in treating cancer. 114 As
only eight to ten years of exclusivity remain, and after having incurred
upwards of 150 million dollars in development expense, the cost to
cancer patients for a full course of treatment will be high. 115
Some years ago, the Legislature addressed the dilemma of the
reduction in monopoly period for therapeutic compounds which results
from the lengthy FDA approval process. In 1984, the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (the Act) was passed. 116
One of the announced objectives of the Act was to provide increased
incentives for research and development of new drugs by granting an
increased term for market exclusivity. 117 To this end, Title II of the
Act provided for an extension of time to be added to the term of a
patent by adding one section to the Patent Act and amending another.
The new section, 35 U.S.C. § 156, describes the conditions that must be
met for a patent term extension to be granted. 118 The amended
section, 35 U.S.C. § 271, provides an ''experimental use" exception to
allow generic drug manufacturers to begin safety and effectiveness
testing of therapeutic compounds in anticipation of the expiration of their
associated patents. 119
As a result of these amendments, if a patented human pharmaceutical
takes ten years to approve, .much of this regulatory review period can be
added to the life of the patent in order to allow the inventor to gain an
effective monopoly closer to the seventeen-year term (now twenty years)
114. Henry, supra note 48, at 617 (citing statistics from the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association (PMA)); see also PMA Lines up with FDA Panel on Drug
Review, CHEMICAL MARKETING REP., Aug. 27, 1990, at 7.
115. See Ronald L. Desrosiers, Note, The Drug Patent Term: Longtime Battleground
in the Control ofHealth Care Costs, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 115 (1989); see also Henry,
supra note 48 (providing an excellent overview of the drug approval process in the
United States, replete with data on regulations and review processes that, together with
research and development costs, combine to slow the process of taking a drug to market
and result in unavailability of desperately needed drugs, or make such drugs available
only at exorbitantly high prices).
116. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 156,271 (1988))
[hereinafter Act of 1984].
117. Susan K. Keyack, Note, The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984: Is it a Healthy Long Term Solution?, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 147
(1989).
118. 35 u.s.c. § 156 (1988).
119. 35 u.s.c. § 271 (1988).
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originally contemplated by Congress in the first Patent Act. 120 Now
an inventor can file a patent and, if it is granted, take several years to
develop and test the compound. Because of the extensions, the inventor
can still enjoy several years of monopoly during which to recover his
investment and profit from his discovery and development efforts. 121
Unfortunately, there is no provision whereby an inventor can file a
patent on a new compound, take ten years to develop the data necessary
to convince the patent office of its practical utility for therapeutic use in
humans, and then get a patent. This means that if an inventor discovers
a compound to treat a new disease, or to treat a disease for which there
is no known animal model or suitable laboratory tests, and there is no
other apparent use for the compound other than for treating humans
afflicted with this disease, then the inventor will have to keep his
discovery a secret and hope that no one preempts him in his attempt to
gather all the data necessary to gain patent protection.
In summary, currently available approaches to overcoming the utility
requirement are not universally helpful to the inventor. First, demonstration of non-clinical uses presupposes that compound claims are available
and that other uses can be demonstrated. Furthermore, the PTO
continues to assert the right to redact from the specification any mention
of clinical use, even when not expressly claimed in the patent application. Second, foreign filing simply postpones the rejection that can be
expected from the PTO for certain types of applications; it cannot buy
enough time to generate clinical data (and neither can filing an SIR).
Finally, the "wait and see" approach of postponing filing until sufficient
data have been generated is of little benefit to small companies or
academic institutions who cannot afford to generate the necessary data
and presents the constant and very real risk of preemption. This last
approach may well represent the darkest legacy of the PTO's current
stance on utility, for it engenders a return to the sort of concealment and
delay of developments that the patent system was designed to avoid.
The next section of this Comment considers whether this state of affairs
can be rationalized as a necessary, if not completely desirable, consequence of contemporary patent policy.

120. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793).
121. The reader should not be left with the impression that these changes in the law
have enjoyed widespread acceptance. See, e.g., Jonathan L. Mezrich, The Patentability
and Patent Term Extension of Lifesaving Drugs: A Deadly Mistake, 74 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 77 (1992) (arguing that these reforms allow pharmaceutical
companies to enjoy obscene profits from extended monopoly terms for lifesaving drugs
and have not accomplished the objective of passing the advantage oflonger patent terms
on to consumers in the form of lower prices calculated to recover research and
development investment costs).
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V.

CRITIQUE OF THE STATUS

Quo

From the foregoing, it would appear that the practical utility requirement can represent a substantial, if not insurmountable barrier to
patentability, particularly for new pharmaceutical inventions for
incurable diseases or in relatively new areas of research. Many
practitioners. argue that examiners are going beyond the case law and
beyond their own guidelines to reject "almost uniformly" many
biotechnology-based therapy claims. 122 Ironically, if the patent system
was intended to foster research and development, it would seem that
research in these areas would be especially worth promoting. If the
practical utility requirement is being used to deny patents for potentially
important pharmaceuticals, how can this be justified? What legitimate
reasons could the patent office have for denying these patents?
Three reasons that are typically offered by the PTO for its widespread
rejection of many of these sorts of patent applications are discussed in
this section.

A.

Protect the Public from Ineffective or Unhealthy Drugs

Many utility rejections are framed in such a way as to indicate a
concern by the PTO over the safety and effectiveness of the claimed
compounds. For example, the Board upheld the examiner's rejection of
claims in the Balzarini 123 application on utility and enablement
grounds, but dismissed the examiner's arguments to the extent to which
they were based on safety and effectiveness concerns: "We do not find
the examiner's concern in regard to possible side effects ... to be
particularly relevant to the present inquiry . . . . Whether such side
effects outweigh the anti-viral utility in treating specific patients ... is
a matter left to the appropriate medical regulating authorities and/or the
treating physician." 124

122. See, e.g., Slind-Flor, supra note 6, at Al.
123. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
124. ExparteBalzarini, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1892, 1895 n.3 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int.
1991); see also In re Issacs, 347 F.2d 887 (C.C.P.A. 1965). The court in Issacs
expressed concern over the examiner's contention that
the average physician is not going to try a completely untested material nor
experiment to determine what might be an effective dosage ... [and] would
not barter the lives of his patients for the remote possibility that he may prove
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The utility requirement should be considered from the perspective of
the person of ordinary skill in the art; if this hypothetical person, upon
review of in vitro data, does not find the claimed utility to be "incredible," then a utility rejection would be inappropriate. The utility standard
can be satisfied by laboratory testing, but the PTO has adopted the
position that, in some cases, laboratory testing is no substitute for human
clinical trials. 125
Safety and effectiveness is of legitimate concern to the FDA, but how
does it bear on the question of patentable utility? There was a time
(around the turn of the century) when the patent office required a higher
standard of proof of utility for human medicines than it does today. 126
This was the era of "patent medicines" and traveling medicine shows,
where the very fact that a medicinal composition had been patented
represented a potent marketing tool. 127 There was a concern that the
patent office, as a governmental agency, gave "an oblique imprimatur of
government that could be used to deceive the consuming public into
using fraudulent medicines." 128
In 1938, Congress enacted the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FFDCA of 193 8) to ensure that drugs marketed for human consumption
were proved to be safe and effective. 129 During the middle of the
twentieth century in Europe, 8,000 babies were born with birth defe,cts
attributable to an unrecognized side-effect of thalidomide, a drug used
to combat morning sickness in pregnant women. 130 This led to
amendments of the FFDCA (the Kefauver-Harris Amendments) that
substantially increased the power of the FDA to regulate the drug
industry and mitigate the fears of the public about the safety of the drugs

that this unknown or untested material is or is not effective in the treatment of
a particular disease.
Id. at 889.
125. MPEP, supra note 36, at 600-41. For example, section 608.0l(p) of the
manual instructs examiners that "if the utility relied on is directed solelyto the treatment
of humans, evidence of utility, if required, must generally be clinical evidence." Id.
126. Noonan, supra note 9, at 277.
127. Id.; see also 1 CHISUM, supra note 41, § 4.04(2][a].
128. Noonan, supra note 9, at 277.
129. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat
1040 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 (1988)) [hereinafter FFDCA of
1938].
130. Henry, supra note 48, at 619. The thalidomide crisis shocked the world and
resulted in a demand by the public for greater confidence in the safety of prescription
drugs. Although the FFDCA was a major improvement over the earlier, laissez-faire
approach to the sale of drugs, clearly, even more diligence on the part of drug
manufacturers and the FDA was needed if the public was to be adequately protected.
Id.
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it was taking. 131 These amendments imposed a much more stringent
requirement for a substantial proof of safety and efficacy. 132
Today, largely on the authority of the Kefauver-Harris Amendments,
the drug approval process is considerably longer and more expensive
than was previously the case. A drug cannot be marketed for use in
humans without FDA approval. 133 Due in large part to the complexity
of human clinical trials and the FDA mandate to provide a clear and
convincing case for the safety and efficacy of any proposed drug, it
should come as no surprise that these studies are quite expensive and
very time consuming. 134
Given the authority of the FDA, as established by the FFDCA of 1938
and expanded by the Kefauver-Harris Amendments, to regulate the
pharmaceutical industry, should the PTO be concerned about the safety
and effectiveness of various drug compounds?
This issue was raised in the 1962 decision of the CCPA in In re
Hartop. 135 The Hartop application claimed a pharmaceutical composition containing a stable solution of sodium thiopental for use as an
anesthetic. 136 The 'applicant in Hartop provided data from testing on
experimental animal models, but no results of testing in humans. 137

131. The Kefauver-Harris Amendments, Pub. L. No 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962);
see also Henry, supra note 48, at 619-20.
132. Griffin, supra note 48, at 377; see also Henry, supra note 48, at 619-20.
133. FFDCA ofl938 (as amended by Kefauver-Harris), supra note 129. Approval
is granted in stages. First, pre-clinical research and development testing is reviewed and
an Investigational New Drug (IND) application is prepared. The IND must be filed with
the FDA before clinical testing in humans can commence. This testing is comprised of
three phases that, taken together, evaluate not only the safety and efficacy, but potential
side effects, adverse reactions, and contraindications of the drug. This testing involves
a sufficient number oftest subjects to provide statistically meaningful results and it may,
in some cases, take years to identify and enroll sufficient numbers of appropriate test
subjects to complete the clinical trials. The results of such testing are included within
a New Drug Application (NDA), which must be approved prior to marketing the drug.
Id
134. The IND and NDA processes, together, take upwards of eight years. When the
FDA review process (typically involving two to three years) is added, the entire
development and approval process can take from 10-12 years. See, e.g., Henry, supra
note 48; see also Public Hearing, supra note 10, at 13 .
135. 135 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 419 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
136. Id at 420.
137. Id at 424.
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The patent office rejected the application for failure to show safety and
effectiveness in humans. 138
The CCPA reversed, stating that "[t]he examiner and the board have
insisted upon 'clear and convincing proof' that the claimed solutions ...
are 'safe' . . . . What then is 'safe' and what degree' of 'proof' is
necessary in a case like this?" 139 Judge Martin discussed at some
length the proper definition of safety:
Bearing in mind that absolute proof of ... 'safety' of a drug or medicament is
impossible and that 'proof' of 'safety' is relative ... we do not believe that
such a degree of 'proof' is necessary in view of the/actual situation in the case
at bar. We think that a sufficient probability of safety in human therapy has
been demonstrated in the case at bar to satisfy [the utility requirement). 140

Hartop explained that the requirements for patentability are distinct
from the requirements for approval by the FDA. "A comparison of [35
U.S.C. § 101] with the detailed provisions of the ... Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act indicates ... if Congress had intended to use
its constitutional authority under the patent clause . . . it would have
enacted drug patent legislation in detail corresponding to [this Act]." 141
The Hartop·court stated that the proper test for determining patentability should not be absolute proof, but a "sufficient probability" of
safety. 142 In a concurring opinion, Judge Smith agreed that Congress
had intended for the PTO and the FDA to have their own respective
functions and that "safety and effectiveness in man" is not a condition
of patentability under the statute:
To have complied with the requirements of the Patent Office in the present
case, based on its assumption of some vaguely asserted "statutory duty" imposed
on the Patent Office, would have meant an extensive delay before proofs of
"safety and effectiveness in man" acceptable to the examiner could have been
secured. This delay would have started with securing permission from the
[FDA] to so test the composition. . . . [To complete the necessary testing]
could well mean the delay of many years before the present application could
be allowed and the patent issued. 4

Despite the dicta of Justices Martin and Smith in Hartop, safety and
effectiveness questions continue to provide a basis for rejecting
pharmaceutical patent applications. An intriguing case to consider in
138. Id
139. Id
140. Id at 426.
141. Id at 428.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 429 (Smith, J., concurring). Mindful of the delay that such testing would
necessarily involve, Judge Smith noted that an important purpose of patent law is to
promote prompt publication ofinventions (in order to stimulate follow-on development).
Id. at 430.
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this context is In· re Issacs, 144 which was decided just a few years after
Hartop. Issacs attempted to patent interferon, a natural substance with
potent anti-viral and anti-cancer activity. 145 The application was
denied for "lack of demonstrated utility in the absence of a showing that
the compositions are safe, effective and reliable for their intended purpose."146
.
The Board upheld the rejection, reasoning that absent evidence of in
vivo or human testing there could be no patentable utility. 147 The
CCPA reversed, noting that neither the patent examiner nor the Board
cited any authority for the necessity of in vivo or human testing to fulfill
the statutory requirements for patentability. 148 However,. the dissenting opinion in Issacs mi:tde it clear that the utility requirement remained
unsettled. Although the applicants made no express claim to a use for
interferon in treating viral infections in humans, Judge Almond reasoned
that "test tubes [are not] vaccinated against viruses" and, therefore, what
could be the utility if not as a therapeutic compound? 149
Much criticism has been leveled at the PTO conc.eming these safety
and effectiveness issues and their impact on the utility requirement.
Robert P. Blackbum, the chief patent counsel for Chiron Corporation, is
but one of a number of practitioners to vocalize concern over a series of
recent decisions by the Board that tend to affirm rejections on utility
grounds despite a showing of pharmaceutical activity. Blackbum
reasons that "the cost and time of generating such [convincing clinical]
data in humans ... is incompatible with the expeditious prosecution of
patent applications as well as the financial resources of small biotechnology companies and universities." 150
Another safety and effectiveness case, Ex parte Rubin, 151 involved
a claim for improved effectiveness of interferon in the treatment of

144. 347 F.2d 887 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
145. Id at 888.
146. Id
147. Id at 889.
148. Id
149. Id at 893 (Almond, J., dissenting).
150. Ludlam & Feldbaum, supra note 4. Ironically, although the PTO seems to be
demanding more and more human clinical data, the FDA may be moving away from
clinical data as the gold standard for safety and effectiveness, particularly for critical
pharmaceuticals. Public Hearing, supra note l0{testimony ofEugene Schonfield of the
National Kidney Cancer Association).
151. 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1987).
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certain types of cancer. The examiner had rejected the Rubin application, but the Board reversed, explaining that because "[n]o reason to
doubt 'the objective truth' of the asserted utility [was] advanced by the
examiner, we accept appellant's disclosure of utility." 152
Rubin was not decided on the basis that the claimed utility was clearly
believable, but the court asked instead whether the utility would be
clearly unbelievable to another scientist skilled in the art. That is a
fundamental distinction, shifting the burden of proof from the applicant
to the patent office. In other words, it is not so much for the applicant
to convince the examiner that his claimed invention is useful as it is the
affirmative duty of the examiner to explain to the applicant why she
found any particular utility unbelievable.
From the foregoing, it should be 'apparent that, despite the advent of
legislation and a parallel administrative regimen designed to ensure that
drugs intended for use in humans be proved safe and effective,
examiners continue to assess patentable utility in terms of safety and
effectiveness. Given the absence of any statutory basis for couching
utility rejections in such terms, and especially in light of repeated
reversals of such decisions by the Board, the explanation for this
continued practice remains unclear.

B.

Capacity Issues: So Many Applications, So Little Time

Another explanation for this utility rejection phenomenon concerns the
ability of the patent office to manage an ever-growing number of
increasingly sophisticated applications. The patent office is organized
into functional "art" groups designed to ensure that patent applications
are reviewed by examiners with the expertise necessary for proper
evaluation. In 1988, the House of Representatives Small Business
Subcommittee on Regulation and Business Opportunity determined that
the PTO had a backlog of over 10,000 biotechnology-related patent
applications and predicted that the total number of applications received
would rise by about twelve percent per year. 153
Biotechnology applications had previously been distributed among four
different examining groups, but in response to the growing number of
biotechnology applications and due to the acknowledged complexity of
reviewing these applications, the PTO created a new examining group
152. Id at 1462.
153. Robert P. Merges, Congress Expresses Concern Over Backlog of Biotech
Patent Applications, GENETIC ENG. NEWS, May, 1988 at 3. In 1991, the PTO reported
that the backlog ("[W]e prefer to call [it] 'inventory,"' said PTO Administrator Charles
Van Horn) stood at 17,336 pending patents. David N. Leff, PTO Confronts 'Inventory'
Overload, BIOWORLD TODAY, Aug. 19, 1992, at 1.
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(Group 1800). 154 This group is largely comprised of examiners with
advanced degrees; in 1989, the most recent year for which these
statistics are available, over sixty percent of examiners in this group had
advanced degrees. 155
Although all examiners go through a patent office "academy," training
tends to be accomplished on the job through a mentoring process. As
of 1989, relatively few of the Group 1800 examiners had law degrees,
and even though Group 1800 drew from the ranks of other established
examining groups, the examiners in this group were relatively inexperienced in the patent examining process. 156 The patent office has
conceded that their examiners may need additional training in law, not
science. 157
It could be argued that the problem with pioneering biotechnology or
pharmaceutical inventions is that they represent such a fundamental
breakthrough in the field that the full. implications of the invention
cannot be understood by the typical patent examiner. 158 Or, less
charitably, it might be argued that the utility requirement represents an
attractive tool for patent examiners to manage their workload by
summarily rejecting any applications purporting to claim a therapeutic
use unsupported by clinical data. On the other hand, another way to
manage the backlog would be to grant patents more liberally and in that
way circumvent the continuing application process that utility rejections

154. Bio-Applicants Too Blamed for Snail-Pace US. Patents, BIOTECH.
NEWSWATCH, June 6, 1988, at 1 [herinafter Bio-Applicants]. This group was originally
designated Group 180; as the size of this and other examining groups grew it was redesignated 1800. Whether reference is made to Group 180 or 1800, they are
synonymous. Telephone Interview with Representative of United States Patent Office
Information Line (Aug. 1994).
155. IVER P. COOPER, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW app. 1.205 (1989).
156. Id
157. Commissioner of Patents Bruce Lehman has announced plans by the PTO to
develop a legal training program for all examiners, leading to an L.L.M. degree. Public
Hearing, supra note 10; see also Slind-Flor, supra note 6, at A22 (quoting Commissioner
Lehman: "We need [the examiners] to become more sophisticated [in the area of the
law].").
158. For a fascinating exposition of this theory, see Mark F. Grady & Jay I.
Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305 (1992). In these
authors' view, there exists "an underlying unity that explains the seemingly disorderly
patent results." Patent protection is denied in cases where the utility is not clear because
the patent rules have developed through trial and error to "minimize rent dissipation in
the pioneer development stage [to control economically distorting effects of a monopoly
grant]." Id at 309.
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tend to foster. 159 The more sensible approach might be to articulate
clear standards for patentability that are consistent with the statutory law
and apply those standards consistently. This would, at the very least,
decrease the level of uncertainty involved in the patent application
process and should improve efficiency for both applicant and examiner.

C.

Implications of the Patent Grant Monopoly

It is impossible to adequately discuss the utility requirement of 35
U.S.C. § 101 without reference to the enablement requirement of§ 112.
The former requires that the invention be put to some use; the latter
requires that the invention adequately disclose just how one would put
the invention to that use. These requirements can be considered "what's
the use?" and "how to use," respectively. To comply with § 112, an
application must include a detailed description of the manner and process
of making and using the claimed invention; this description has been
termed the "quid pro quo" or consideration for the patent grant contract
from the government. 160
An invention can have obvious utility .and still be held unpatentable
for not having adequately described how the invention is to be used. On
the other hand, if an invention is not useful, it cannot be possible to
teach someone how to use it. 161
Brenner v. Manson 162 considered whether compounds and processes
for making them should be patentable if the compounds are the subject
of serious scientific investigation. It was this contention, that use of
compounds in research could constitute a patentable utility, that the court
seemed to find most troublesome. 163 The holding in Manson was
based on a concern that to accept this standard of utility (useful for
scientific research) would give a result contrary to public policy, namely,

159. See, e.g., Bio-Applicants,supra note 154, at 1 (reporting that, in response to
criticism over delays, examiners are allowing patents with overbroad claims).
160. 2 CHISUM, supra note 41, § 7.03[6], provides a basic overview or primer for
the interrelationship between these statutory requirements. For insight into the tension
that exists between the desire to foster innovation and the need to limit monopolies
inherent in a patent grant, see, e.g., William D. Noonan, Understanding Patent Scope,
65 OR. L. REV. 717 (1986). For an in-depth analysis of the economic implications of
a patent, see Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of
Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990).
161. 2 CHISUM, supra note 41 (citing the decision in In re Fouche, 439 F.2d 1237
(C.C.P.A. 1971), wherein the court held "rejection under§ 101 ... leads to a rejection
under ... § 112, since if [claimed] compositions are in fact useless, appellant's
specification cannot have taught how to use them").
162. 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
163. Justice Fortas explained that the quid pro quo was not simply disclosure, but
disclosure resulting in a "substantial utility." Id. at 534.
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to grant a monopoly to an inventor over large areas of future research
into potential end uses of the product. 164
In Ex parte Stevens, 165 the Board considered a case involving a
claimed treatment for cancer. No experimental data was included in the
patent application; instead, a composition and proposed method of use
were proffered. 166 The Board noted that because there was no proof
that the claimed invention would work as intended, the failure to meet
the utility requirement would result in a prima facie lack of
enablement. 167
Where there is no enablement, as in Stevens, it would stand to reason
that rejection on that basis alone would suffice. It would appear that the
utility requirement was used there as an expeditious alternative to
providing a rationale for rejection under § 112. 168
The enablement requirement provides a statutory basis for ensuring
that inventors are not granted· patent claims they have not· earned. 169

164. Id This concern seems to overlook the economic realities of cross-licensing
as well as the stimulus to follow-on development that patents provide. As for the quid
pro quo argument, what is the harm in granting a monopoly over a useless product?
165. 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1379 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1990).
166. Id at 1380. The claims in the Stevens application were rejected on the "how
to use" provision of§ 112 rather than the "is it useful?" test of§ 101. In either event,
the examiner's rejections were affirmed on grounds that no evidence at all was offered;
instead, an experimental "paper" protocol was submitted, along with a disclosure by the
applicants that no work at all had been done to test operability of their invention. Id
167. The Board alluded to the inherent connection between the "what's the use?"
provision of§ 101 and the "how to use" provision of§ 112 (discussed supra in text
accompanying note 160): "[W]e have combined two separate grounds of rejection set
forth by the examiner ... because we believe that there is but a single issue ... and that
the practice ofraising that issue in a rejection under either 35 U.S.C. § 101 or§ 112, or
both, has been judicially approved." Id (citing In re Fouche, 439 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A
1971)).
168. The utility/operability dynamic reflected in the related but distinguishable
requirements of§§ 101 and 112 is described supra in text accompanying note 160. It
is also not uncommon for applications to be rejected on the basis of lack of utility under
§ 101, or obviousness under§ 103, or both, the reasoning being that, if an invention is
useful, it must be obvious, and if it is not obvious, it cannot be useful, a phenomenon
referred to as the "squeeze." BIO Report, supra note 11, at 12, 70.
169. It could be argued that dispensing with the utility requirement altogether would
have no obvious impact on patentability of pharmaceutical or biotechnology inventions,
given the enablement requirement. Indeed, within weeks of the Commissioner's
announcement of new guidelines (which purportedly relaxed the utility standard),
practitioners complained that examiners have simply substituted one section of the law
for another to justify their continuing demand for clinical data. See, e.g., No End for
Biotech Patent Woes?, 267 Ser. 1083 (1995).
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Yet the concern over granting monopolies continues to influence the way
patent matters are adjudicated. This concern, although well-intentioned,
could unnecessarily hinder pharmaceutical development by smaller, less
established companies. This derives from the barriers to market entry
that the FDA and PTO erect.
Pharmaceutical development typically involves a development process
whereby large numbers of potentially useful compounds are identified
and tested in vitro. 170 Later, some of the more promising compounds
are tested in vivo (in animal models). Finally, one or a few of the most
promising compounds are evaluated in humans for safety and effectiveness.171
As a general rule, the time and expense rises dramatically from the
preliminary research stage (production and in vitro testing) to the in vivo
stage (laboratory animal testing) and also from the in vivo stage to the
final stage of testing in humans. 172 As a practical matter, the complexity and expense of testing in experimental models involving laboratory
animals, let alone humans, is so great as to effectively limit the field to
large, established pharmaceutical companies willing and able to spend
several years and several million dollars in drug development. 173
Thus, to avoid granting a monopoly to inventors who have made a de
minim is showing· of utility, the patent office has awarded a de facto
monopoly to large companies who have made no showing at all.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

This Comment has described how the concept of patentable utility can
present difficulties for inventors attempting to patent compounds for
which the only apparent utility is as a treatment of disease in humans.
170. Henry, supra note 48, at 617; see also BIO Report, supra note 11, at 13.
171. Henry, supra note 48, at 617. Henry reports that, for every 10,000 drug
candidates created in the laboratory, only 1,000 will make it to the next stage of testing
(in vivo testing in experimental models) and of these only one may survive through the
testing and approval processes to find its way to market. Id
172. Recent estimates suggest that the cost to do preliminary testing alone (to get
the necessary approval to test in humans) can easily exceed one million dollars. Then,
preparations must be made to perform clinical studies and products to be tested must be
made at an industrial scale under controlled conditions. Finally, preparation of clinical
protocols, patient informed consents, case report forms, hospital review board approvals,
and preparations for site inspections (by the FDA) also take time and money. Thus,
millions of dollars and literally years in development time can be spent before the first
test of safety and. effectiveness in humans can be performed. BIO Report, supra note
ll,atl3.
173. This is a very real concern for biotechnology companies that tend on the whole
to be small (less than 100 employees) and cash-poor. This concern is shared by research
institutions, such as universities who tend to outlicense technology early and leave
development and approval to licensees. Id
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A review of the case law showed how the utility requirement has been
applied by the patent office and interpreted by the courts to raise the
hurdle for obtaining pharmaceutical patents. Hypotheticals were
presented to illustrate how the utility requirement, as presently applied,
is unnecessary and can represent a nearly insurmountable obstacle to
patenting new therapeutic compounds in certain disease settings.
Although the patent office continues to embrace an assumed role of
protecting the public from false or misleading assertions, 174 it seems
clear that this responsibility resides more properly with the FDA (and
other regulatory agencies, as appropriate). Recent decisions of the
federal.circuit would appear to support this contention, at least so far as
safety and effectiveness issues are concerned. Given the backlog of
patent applications in the PTO, the increasing pendency period for
applications undergoing examination, and the increasing frustration
expressed by many over misapplication of the utility requirement, one
could respectfully suggest that the PTO confine itself to applying the
statutory requirements for patentability within the examination process
and trust the FDA, the FTC, the EPA, the SEC, and other assorted
agencies to perform their respective roles.
The most compelling case for the utility requirement can be found in
the rationale for the patent system, that is, to grant, for a limited time,
an exclusive monopoly over an invention in exchange for teaching the
public how to use that invention. However, because the enablement
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 provides that the scope of patent claims
be commensurate with disclosure, 175 there is no advantage to accomplishing this policy objective by parallel application of two distinct
patentability requirements.

174. As recently as September 1994, the Commissioner of Patents explained:
[S]ome have expressed concern over the nature of [sic] quantity of evidence
required by the PTO during examination to support claims for inventions used
to treat human disorders [and that such concerns are based on a rejection of the
PTO's role in] assess[ing] the effectiveness or safety of a human therapeutic
invention. Yet, others have identified important public policy justifications .
. . . [W]ith the imprimatur of the Federal Government, a patent can also affect
the commercial prospects of the invention in question, and can raise or lower
expectations of those afflicted with the illness the invention is designed to
treat.
Commissioner's Notice, supra note IO, at 45,269.
I 75. See discussion supra at notes 160-68 and accompanying text.
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Legislation 176 designed to foster research and development of new
pharmaceutical compounds by streamlining the FDA approval process
has addressed the process from the standpoint of taking a patented drug
to the pharmacy shelf. A return to the original de minimis standard of
patentable utility will provide healthy incentives for new drug development and thereby accomplish key policy objectives shared by the PTO
and the FDA.
TIMOTHY

176.
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See discussion supra at notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
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